NEWSWEEK: Do you expect anything significant to come out of this trip? Rob Malley: In hindsight, I think it may be seen as the Iraq-Iran trip. That might be the focal point. It’s above all a check-the-box trip [to Israel]. He hasn’t been to Israel and the Palestinian territories since he’s been president. If he were to wait, things could break down—it could be too late. Frankly, nothing has happened since Annapolis, politically.
In a perfect world, where would the parties be right now? For all the good intentions, to a large extent this is a virtual peace process almost wholly detached from the realities. Gaza is under Hamas. In the West Bank most of the control is guaranteed by the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]. [Palestinian President Mahmoud] Abbas has major challenges. [Israeli Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert is not in the strongest state. At a minimum, you need a much more engaged, decisive, constant U.S. effort. There is a disconnect between aspirations and reality.
What do you make of the news of the past few weeks? If you and I had spoken last fall and said, “What are the things that can get in the way of this process?” I would have said: increased rocket fire, settlement activity, killing of Israelis. That’s the negative side. And on the positive side there’s been very little. Right now you have three dynamics working against each other. The first is between Israel and the Palestinians—really, Israel and [Abbas’s party] Fatah—that’s one process. The second is the dynamic between Fatah and Hamas. The third is between the authorities in Gaza: Hamas and Israel. Each one is impeding the other. There’s always one of the three actors who’s ready to sabotage the process. It’s very hard to see how things proceed smoothly.
As a former negotiator, how frustrating is it to hold these kinds of talks against the backdrop of Israeli military raids into Gaza? I think [the Americans] were more frustrated with the [settlement] announcements. It’s the worst time, worst way, worst place. The symbolism of building in Har Homa was particularly painful for the Americans. It’s a bit more difficult for the Americans to second-guess the Israelis on security. I think they’ll more likely take them up on the settlement issue and the outposts. These are black-and-white issues where Israel is simply not living up to its commitments. On the other side, is [Palestinian Prime Minister Salam] Fayyad doing enough on the security side? Is Israel acting with some justification? Those are harder issues for the American administration to take a clear-cut view on.
How likely do see the prospect of a full-fledged Israeli invasion into Gaza? The biggest risk of a conflagration right now is a broader conflict between Hamas and Israel. One rocket hits a school, and whatever reluctance to invade that exists right now will disappear.
The final report of the Winograd Commission, the Israeli body investigating the conduct of the Lebanon war, is due later this month. Will Olmert survive it? So far Olmert seems to have dodged quite a few bullets. At this point most analysts think he has survived this. There doesn’t seem to be a great appetite on [Labor Party leader Ehud] Barak’s part to leave the coalition. But we’ll have to see how severe the report will be.
Any chance of another try at a unity government deal between Hamas and Fatah? There are always periodic mentions of it. President Abbas gave a speech recently that was more conciliatory. [Damascus-based Hamas leader Khaled] Meshaal hinted at early elections. Both are making fairly favorable noises. But Abbas has no serious desire for talks. The reason the [2006] Mecca agreement [between Fatah and Hamas] collapsed had very little to do with ideology. It’s about who controls security, who controls the PLO. Until both sides are ready to have honest power sharing, all these talks will be aimed at placating public opinion.
Can you see any scenario in which a peace agreement is reached by the end of Bush’s term, as all the parties claim they want? It is possible—all three actors see real merits because of their respective weaknesses. A final-status agreement—that’s the least likely. But there are fallbacks. One could be a vaguer but significant document of understanding, a doctrine for the future that would lay out the parameters of an agreement. I can see different scenarios that could be pointed to as positive.
